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STATUTE OF FRAUDS-DEBT OF ANOTHER-ORIGINAL PROMISE-
CONSIDERATION-Miller vs. Hanna-Logan, Inc.-No. 13369-
Decided September 10, 1934-Opinion by Mr. Justice Butler.
Miller promised plaintiff that, if plaintiff would forbear repos-
sessing a truck sold to one Ashenbrenner, and would allow said truck
to continue to be used on a certain farm, Miller would pay the balance
of Ashenbrenner's note for the purchase price of the truck. Miller was
financially interested in the operations of said farm.
1. Miller's promise was an original one, and was not within the
Statute of Frauds.
2. Plaintiff's forbearance was a sufficient consideration for Mil-
ler's promise to pay.-Judgment affirmed.
CRIMINAL LAW-BANKING CODE-FALSE STATEMENT OF BANK
OFFICERS-Ernest H. Drinkgern and Arthur H. Schnell vs. The
People of the State of Colorado-No. 13067-Decided Septem-
ber 10, 1934--Opinion by Mr. Justice Bouck.
Drinkgern and Schnell were convicted under the Colorado Bank-
ing Code on an information charging that as officers of the Farmers
State Bank of Brighton they falsely and feloniously made a written
statement to the banking commissioner that twenty-two $500 bonds
of The Brighton Improvement Company were of the market value
of $11,000.
1. The court, in reversing the conviction, said that in order to
prove the falsity of the statement, the district attorney went far afield,
and the trial court admitted a mass of testimony that was only remotely,
if at all, relevant.
2. The only testimony on the market value of the bonds was
that the twenty-two $500 bonds had a market value of $11,000, and
that there was no admissible testimony that the market value was less.
-Judgment reversed.
AUTOMOBILE COLLISION-NEGLIGENCE-FAMILY CAR DOCTRINE-
TESTIMONY ON INSURANCE-Margaret Boltz vs. Grace Bonner
-No. 13203-Decided September 10, 1934--Opinion by Mr.
Justice Bouck.
Margaret S. Boltz, plaintiff in error, was the losing defendant at
the trial in three separate suits tried together wherein it was found
that the negligence of Wilma Boltz, daughter of Margaret, concurring
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with others, caused the injuries for which damages were awarded.
Margaret Boltz alone sought reversal on writ of error.
Three questions were raised: 1. Was the car owned by Mar-
garet a family car, thus imposing liability on Margaret for the negligence
of her daughter, Wilma; 2. Was testimony touching on an insurance
policy involving others not appearing in the Supreme Court, erroneously
admitted; and 3. Was Wilma negligent.
Affirming the judgment of damages in all cases against Margaret
the court held:
1. Margaret's own testimony "Well, I permitted her to use it
(the automobile) when she asked me for it, and when it suited me to
let her have it . . . for her own pleasure" amply sustained the point
that the automobile was a family car.
2. The ianquiry concerning insurance between those not parties
to this record was not error of which Margaret could complain, and
3. On substantial conflict in testimony the trial court found
negligence on Wilma's part, and this concluded the appellate court.
WASTE WATER-POINTS FOR DISCHARGE-COMMISSIONER TO REC-
OMMEND NUMBER AND LOCATION-Pettit, et al. vs. Waline-No.
13209-Decided September 10, 1934-Opinion by Mr. Justice
Butler.
1. In an injunction suit to prevent discharge of waste water
from defendant's lands into a lateral ditch, it is within the issues for
the court to limit the number of the points for discharge of such waste
water.
2. It is proper for the court to appoint a commissioner to recom-
mend the number and location of the points for discharge, and, upon
failure of a party to object in the trial court to the commissioner's re-
port,. such party cannot urge in the appellate court that the commis-
sioner was not sworn as a witness.
3. The decree fixing the points for discharge being based on con-
dition then existing, the decree should save the rights of defendants to
apply for a change of location of said points whenever different condi-
tions make such change necessary.-Decree modified, and as modified,
affirmed.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-ZONING ORDINANCES-TEST IS REA-
SONABLENESS-The City of Colorado Springs vs. Miller-No.
13058-Decided September 10, 19 3 4 -Opinion by Mr. Justice
Holland.
The local authorities are the primary judges of the reasonableness
of a zoning ordinance. Unless they unmistakably exceed a reasonable
exercise of their authority, the courts should not interfere. The ordi-
nance was not unreasonable as it related to the property herein involved.
-- Judgment affirmed.
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NEGLIGENCE-AUTOMOBILES-EVIDENCE-Beauregard Ross vs. Val
C. Sherman and Elizabeth Sherman-No. 13119-Decided Sep-
tember 10, 1934.
FACTS.-The defendants, Sherman and his wife, obtained a non-
suit in a case brought by Ross, a pedestrian, for damages resulting from
defendants' car striking plaintiff while plaintiff was crossing a street
at intersection. Sherman's wife was driving the car and she noticed
defendant crossing street. She honked her horn once and slackened
speed to about five miles an hour. Defendant saw Mrs. Sherman when
she was in the center of the intersection. At that time Mrs. Sherman
came to a standstill; both parties became confused; Mrs. Sherman
started the car and struck plaintiff.
HELD.-Whether or not defendant was guilty of negligence was
a question of fact for the jury to determine. In granting a non-sui
the court erred. A moment's wait on part of the defendant would have
averted the accident. It was a clear question of whether the driver was
exercising due care, which must be determined by the jury.
The court approved the trial court ruling in excluding certain X-
ray plates offered in evidence. For lack of the requisite preliminary
knowledge of necessary facts on part of the witness.-Reversed.
WORKMAN'S COMPENSATION--STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS FOR FILING
CLAIM-COMPENSATION INJURY-Frank vs. Industrial Com-
mission et al.-No. 13573-Decided September 24, 1934-
Opinion by Mr. Justice Bouck.
Frank was denied compensation under the Workman's Compen-
sation Act as an employee of the Black Diamond Fuel Co., both by
the Commission and by the Court below. The claim was for a rup-
tured appendix with resulting peritonitis. Claimant testified that he
was lifting a mine car in the company's coal mine, and as a result of
such lifting, appendix was ruptured. The accident occurred October 11,
1932, but no notice of claim was filed with the Commission until
August 4, 1933.
1. The testimony of the claimant that the injury arose out of
and in the course of his employment was not refused. Hence, the Com-
mission erred ion denying compensation.
2. The statute provides that the rights to compensation shall be
barred unless within six months after the injury notice claiming com-
pensation shall be filed with the Commission, but where the employer
furnished medical services to the claimant this was the equivalent of
paying compensation and comes withinr the exception of the statute
that the bar shall not apply to claimant unless compensation has been
paid.
3. Where the employer adopts a medical plan to furnish medical
and kindred services to its employees it is the equivalent of payment to
the employee.--Judgment reversed.
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SURETYSHIP AND LIABILITY UNDER INDEMNITY CONTRACTS-Gard-
ner Bros. and Glenn Construction Company, a Corporation, vs.
American Surety Company of New York, a Corporation--No.
13160-Decided September 10, 1934.
FACTS.-Plaintiff contracted with the state to construct a certain
highway at plaintiff's own cost and expense. Plaintiff entered into a
contract with one Biscup for a supply of gravel under certain dondi-
tions. Defendant executed the bond which would indemnify plaintiff
for any loss occassiloned by Biscup in not fulfilling his contract with
plaintiff. After the work had progressed Biscup was not living up to
the contract in not-supplying the quality of gravel agreed on. Plaintiff
notified defendant of the acts of Biscup. Defendant assured plaintiff
that Biscup would do the work specified in the contract. After the
completion of the principal contract plaintiff was forced to pay numer-
ous debts which Biscup had incurred in fulfilling the contract between
Biscup and plaintiff. Plaintiff is now suing defendant for these sums
so paid. Defendant filed a motion to strike and a motion to dismiss.
The trial court treated these motions as a general demurrer, which was
sustained.
HELD.-An indemnity or security contract, like written instru-
ments, generally is to have a reasonable interpretation or construction.
Defendant is entitled to have its contract construed according to the
plain meaning of its terms. Biscup complied with his contract to furnish
gravel and that was as far as defendant assumed to indemnify the plain-
tiff. The acts of defendant in having Biscup comply with his, contract
would not put a new form on defendant's obligation. Biscup having
complied with his contract with plaintiff, the defendant's liability
ceases. The court approves the sustaining of the demurrer. -Affirmed.
WILLS-CONSTRUCTION-GIFTS IN LIFETIME OF TESTATOR-Hart
us. Hart-No. 13223-Decided September 24, 1934-Opinion
by Mr. Justice Bouck.
Testator's son resided on a farm belonging to the testator. The
testator's will devised the farm to the son, and further provided that, if
testator disposed of the farm in his lifetime, the son should receive its
equivalent in money. Testator traded the farm for other property con-
sisting of a store building, a stock in trade, and a residence. Title to
the store building was taken in testator's name. A bill of sale to the
stock was taken in the son's name and was delivered to him by the
testator. Title to the residence was taken in the son's name without his
knowledge and the deed was never delivered to him. Testator per-
mitted the son to operate the store business in his own name. Upon
testator's death, the executor and the son fixed the value of the farm as
equivalent to the value of all of the property taken by the testator in
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exchange. Under these facts it was held that the stock in trade and the
residence were not gifts to the son but must be accounted for as prop-
erty of the estate, and that the son could not retain them in addition
to receiving their equivalent in money.-Judgment reversed with direc-
tions.
CRIMINAL LAW-RAPE--Schreiner vs. The People-No. 13581-
Decided September 24, 1934-Opinion by Mr. Justice Butler.
Henry Schreiner was convicted of statutory rape and was sentenced
to imprisonment in the penitentiary. He seeks a reversal.
I. In an information for rape upon an unmarried female under
the age of 18 years it is not nencessary to allege that the girl was not
the wife of the defendant. An unmarried girl could not possibly be the
wife of the defendant.
2. Upon defendant's motion to require the People to elect on
what particular act of intercourse the People would rely for conviction,
where there was evidence of several acts, it is in the discretion of the
Court to sustain such motion either before the introduction of evidence
or at the close of the People's case or during the progress of the trial,
and where such motion is sustained, it is immaterial at what stage of
the proceedings it occurs.
3. The Court has power to admit in rebuttal, evidence that
would be admissible in chief. This is the rule unless such admission
has been abused.
4. Evidence of a witness on rebuttal, where his name was not
endorsed upon the information, is admissible.-Judgment affirmed.
WILLS-CAPACITY TO CONTEST-STEPCHILD HAS NO CAPACITY TO
CONTEST WILL-Estate of McCardle et al. vs. Donahue-No.
13354-Decided June 25, 1934--Opinion by Mr. Justice Hit-
liard.
Judgment of dismissal of caveat to a will. Error is assigned. The
caveat was filed by a stepchild of the testator.
1. The purpose of a proceeding to contest a will is to divest the
legatees and devisees of rights in the estate of the testator, and vest the
property in his heirs-at-law, or in the beneficiaries named in another
will.
2. Where the person filing the caveat is a stepchild she had no
such interest in the estate as would entitle her to file a caveat where there
is no allegation of the existence of another will.
3. Persons contesting a will must show legal interest in the
estate.
4. A stepdaughter who is of age has no such interest.
5. Query-Would a minor stepchild have such interest that she
could maintain a caveat where the decedent stood in loco parentis to such
minor child.-Judgment affirmed.
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TRADE NAMES--UNFAIR COMPETITION-PLEADING--ILLEGAL CUS-
TOM-DAMAGES-MISLEADING PUBLIC-COMPETITION--Colo-
rado National Company vs. The Colorado National Bank of Den-
ver-No. 13089-Decided September 24, 1934-Opinion by
Mr. Chief Justice Adams.
1. In an action to enjoin the use of a trade name, it is proper
for the complaint to allege a custom of United States banks to operate
affiliated companies under similar names, even though such practice is
illegal, where defendant's choice of a name, in conjunction with such
custom, would result in unfair competition by making it appear that
the defendant was a corporation affiliated with the plaintiff.
2. The action being one to prevent future injury or damage,
it is sufficient for the complaint to allege that defendant's use of its trade
name would infringe upon the good will attached to the plaintiff's name
and would mislead the public.
3. The controlling test is whether or not defendant's selection
of a name is likely to deceive the ordinary customer and lead him to
believe that he is dealing with the plaintiff, when he is actually deal-
ing with the defendant. Consequently, injunction will not be denied
merely because the businesses of the two concerns are not competitive.-
Judgment affirmed.
NEGRO- DISCRIMINATION AGAINST- REFUSAL TO SERVE IN
RESTAURANT--Crosswaith vs. Bergin-No. 13053-Decided
June 25, 1934--Opinion by Mr. Justice Bouck.
The plaintiff in error, Crosswaith, a negro, sued before a Justice
of the Peace to recover from Bergin $300 for alleged violation of Sec-
tions 4128 and 4129 Compiled Laws of 1921. He was nonsuited and
appealed to the County Court where he was again nonsuited.
Bergin was the cashier and in charge of a restaurant and Cross-
waith, a negro, entered the restaurant and ordered food and was refused
service.
1. Sections 4128 and 4129 Compiled Laws of 1921, provide,
among other things, that all persons in the State of Colorado shall be
entitled to the full and equal enjoyment of the accommodations, ad-
vantages, facilities, and privileges of inns, restaurants, eating houses,
barber shops, public conveyances, theatres and all other places of public
accommodation and amusement, and for refusal to give such privileges
the person who so refuses forfeits not less than $50 or more than $500
to the person aggrieved thereby.
2. The above statutes are constitutional.
3. Under the evidence there was the kind of discrimination
against which the law is aimed, and the plaintiff is entitled to recover.
4. As for pecuniary damage no proof of it is necessary.--Judg-
ment reversed.
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REPLEVIN-NEW TRIAL-NEWLY DISCOVERED EVIDENCE-APPLI-
CATION FOR REHEARING AFTER MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL DIS-
POSED OF-Whiting us. Williams-No. 13531-Decided June
25, 1934-Opinion by Mr. Justice Bouck.
Williams instituted replevin suit in the County Court.
Judgment was rendered against her there and she appealed to the
District Court where again verdict and judgment went against her. She
asked reversal.
Mrs. Whiting and her husband purchased a farm in Boulder Coun-
ty, together with the farming machinery and leased the farm and
executed a promissory note for $800 secured by a chattel mortgage on
the implements and, also, an automobile and motor truck that she
owned. Williams, the plaintiff in error, before maturity purchased the
note and when note was not paid instituted replevin and the defense
was made that fraudulent representations were made in procuring the
note and that Williams was not a bona fide purchaser for value.
1. Where a motion for new trial is filed on the ground of newly
discovered evidence on the ground that the plaintiff's, and his witnesses',
testimony was wilfully false and such motion is denied by the lower
Court, the trial Court's decision on this question of fact is binding upon
this Court, where the evidence is not convincing that any such willful
false testimony was given.
2. The practice of filing an application for a rehearing of a mo-
tion for a new trial after that motion has been fully disposed of and
final judgment entered and appellate orders entered, is not approved.-
Judgment affirmed.
AUTOMOBILES-COLLISION-RIGHT OF WAY-DAMAGES-Loren-
zini vs. Rucker-No. 13273-Decided June 25, 1934--Opinion
by Mr. Justice Butler.
Eugene Rucker obtained a judgment in an action brought against
Lorenzini for the death of Rucker's wife through alleged negligence on
the part of the latter in operating a truck which caused a collision be-
tween a truck and an automobile driven by Mrs. Rucker. Lorenzini
seeks a reversal of the judgment.
1. The driver of a vehicle approaching an intersection shall yield
the right of way to a vehicle which has entered the intersection.
2. Where the evidence shows that the car being driven by Mrs.
Rucker had already entered the intersection of two country roads, and
where the driver of a truck colliding with it testifies that the automobile
was right square in front of him, as he was approaching the intersection
and he thereafter struck the automobile with his truck, striking the
rear of the automobile after it was nearly past the intersection, such
evidence is sufficient to support the finding that the defendant was neg-
ligent and that his negligence was the proximate cause of the collision
and the resulting death of Mrs. Rucker.--Judgment affirmed.
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CRIMINAL LAW-MINOR-LIST OF JURORS-ACCEPTING MINOR'S
PLEA OF GUILTY TO MURDER-DYING DECLARATION-IN-
STRUCTIONS- EVIDENCE OF OTHER OFFENSES -Reppin, an
Infant vs. The People-No. 13445-Decided June 18, 1934-
Opinion by Mr. Justice Butter.
Reppin, a minor, brings here for review a death sentence in a
homicide case.
1. While Section 7067 of the Compiled Laws provides that
every person charged with murder or other felonious crime shall be
furnished, previous to his arraignment, with a list of the jurors, where
the record in the court below is silent as to whether such list is fur-
nished and no objection is made in the trial court on account of the
failure to so furnish, it will be presumed that the trial court proceeded
regularly, and the defendant waived the irregularity if it existed by not
objecting in the court below.
2. Where a minor-18 years old-pleads guilty to homicide on
advice of counsel appointed for him, after the court fully explained the
effects and consequences of such a plea, and where it appears that he was
not mentally defective but understood not only the nature of the crime
committed but also the nature and consequences of a plea. of guilty, the
court did not err in accepting the plea of guilty.
3. To make a dying declaration admissible it is not necessary
that the declarant should have stated at the time that it was made under
a sense of impending death. The consciousness of impending death
may be inferred from the character of the wound and the physical con-
dition of the declarant and from the nature and circumstances of the
case.
4. Where the murder was admitted to have been committed in
the perpetration of robbery, it constituted murder in the first degree
and an instruction limiting the jury to determine what punishment
should be inflicted under murder in the first degree was proper, as second
degree murder was not in the case.
5. The trial upon a plea of guilty, where the killing was mur-
der in the first degree, is to ascertain whether the penalty should be fixec
as death or imprisonment for life, and in this case where the sole ques-
tiQn for the jury to determine was whether the penalty should be fixec
at death or imprisonment for life, evidence is not admissible whicd
shows or tends to show that the accused had committed a crime oi
crimes wholly independent of the offense for which he is on trial, unles,
such independent evidence bears upon the question of intent, and if any
evidence of commission of independent crimes is admitted it is error foi
the court to admit it without cautioning the jury that it was admitted
solely for the purpose of bearing on the question of intent.-Judgmeni
reversed. Mr. Justice Holland, Mr. Justice Bouck and Mr. Justict
Filliard concur specially. Mr. Chief Justice Adams, Mr. Justice Camp.
bell and Mr. Justice Burke dissent.
DICTA 325
WE JUST TELL THEM; WE DON'T EXPLAIN THEM
"Would you mind telling us from what literary source springs
the word 'irregardless' on page 284 of September 'DICTA'. The late
Volney T. Hoggatt was a frequent user; it is suggested that he original-
ly coined the word in his 'Ornery and Worthless Men's Club.'
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